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ON THE ASYMPTOTIC NATURE OF FIRST ORDER MEAN FIELD GAMES
MARKUS FISCHER AND FRANCISCO J. SILVA
Abstract. For a class of finite horizon first order mean field games and associated N-player games,
we give a simple proof of convergence of symmetric N-player Nash equilibria in distributed open-loop
strategies to solutions of the mean field game in Lagrangian form. Lagrangian solutions are then con-
nected with those determined by the usual mean field game system of two coupled first order PDEs, and
convergence of Nash equilibria in distributed Markov strategies is established.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to illustrate a simple way of establishing convergence of open-loop Nash
equilibria in the case of first-order non-stationary Mean Field Games (MFGs). Introduced by J.-M. Lasry
and P.-L. Lions and, independently, by M. Huang, R.P. Malhame´ and P.E. Caines about fifteen years
ago (cf. [34, 31]), mean field games are limit models for non-cooperative symmetric N -player differential
games as the number of players N tends to infinity; see, for instance, the lecture notes [13] and the
recent two-volume work [18]. The notion of solution usually adopted for the prelimit models is that of
a Nash equilibrium. A standard way of making the connection with the limit model rigorous is to show
that a solution of the mean field game yields approximate Nash equilibria for the N -player games, with
approximation error vanishing as N → ∞. In the opposite direction, one aims to prove that a sequence
of N -player Nash equilibria converges, as N tends to infinity, to the mean field game limit.
When Nash equilibria are considered in stochastic open-loop strategies, then their convergence is well
understood and can be established under mild conditions; see [28] and [32], both for finite horizon games
with general, possibly degenerate, Brownian dynamics. The convergence analysis is much harder when
Nash equilibria are defined over Markov feedback strategies with full state information.
A first result in this setting was given by Gomes, Mohr, and Souza [29] for continuous time games
with finite state space. There, convergence of Markovian Nash equilibria is proved, but only if the time
horizon is small enough. A breakthrough was achieved by Cardaliaguet, Delarue, Lasry, and Lions in
[15]. In the setting of games with non-degenerate Brownian dynamics, possibly including common noise,
convergence to the mean field game limit is established there for arbitrary time horizon provided the
so-called master equation associated with the mean field game possesses a unique sufficiently regular
solution. In this case, the convergence analysis can be refined, yielding not only convergence of minimal
costs and propagation of chaos for the Nash equilibrium state trajectories, but also fluctuation and large
deviations results for the associated empirical measures; see Cecchin and Pelino [19] and, independently,
Bayraktar and Cohen [7] for finite state games and the papers by Delarue, Lacker, and Ramanan [23, 24]
for Brownian dynamics without or with common noise.
Well-posedness of the master equation implies uniqueness of solutions for the mean field game. But also
the situation where the mean field game possesses multiple solutions, while the N -player Nash equilibria
in full Markov feedback strategies are still uniquely determined, occurs. In this case, the convergence
problem is in part open. The most general result appears to be the recent preprint [33] by Lacker. There,
for a class of games with non-degenerate Brownian dynamics, it is shown that all limit points of the
N -player Nash equilibria are concentrated on weak solutions of the mean field game; these are more
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general than randomizations of ordinary (“strong”) solutions of the mean field game. In the three recent
works [36], [25] and [20], the authors present case studies, giving criteria for characterizing those mean
field game solutions that can be attained as limits of feedback Nash equilibria with full state information.
Here, we consider a much simpler situation: The underlying dynamics are deterministic with direct
control of players’ states; randomness enters only through the players’ initial positions, which are as-
sumed to be independently and identically distributed. Thanks to the deterministic dynamics without
explicit interaction, players can directly control their entire state trajectories. Thus, the set of strate-
gies (or actions) of each player consists of trajectory-valued functions depending on time and player’s
own position. We call these actions distributed open-loop strategies. By considering randomizations of
these strategies, obtaining what we call randomized distributed open-loop strategies, we obtain existence
of symmetric Nash equilibria in this new class of actions (through a standard fixed point argument), as
well as precompactness of sequences of such equilibria. Convergence to the mean field game equilibrium
in Lagrangian form (see e.g. [16, 8, 17, 10])) along weakly converging subsequences of Nash equilibria
is then established in Theorem 3.1 by showing that the variance of the associated empirical measures
(evaluated by integrating over test functions from a countable family) tends to zero as N →∞. Thus, to
obtain convergence, we essentially prove a law of large numbers for a triangular array (Y Ni )i∈{1,...,N},N∈N
where Y N1 , . . . , Y
N
N are independent and identically distributed with common marginal law that how-
ever depends on N . Let us point out that after obtaining a suitable compactness property for the set
of admissible strategies, the convergence result in Theorem 3.1 can actually be deduced from the more
general results in [28] or [32]. Thus, the main purpose of this result is therefore to give a simple proof of
convergence, which takes advantage of the structure of the dynamics and the deterministic nature of the
underlying differential games. We believe that the techniques considered here could be useful in order to
justify the asymptotic nature of more sophisticated deterministic MFGs (see e.g. [10, 11] dealing with
state constrained problems).
In the second part of this article, we consider additional second order assumptions on the data and we
assume that the initial distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. In
this framework, and following [16], we link the notion of Lagrangian MFG equilibrium to the well known
PDE characterization of mean field games in terms of two coupled first order partial differential equations,
namely a backward first order Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and a forward continuity equation; see
equation (MFG) in Subsection 4.1 below. Under the stronger assumptions mentioned above, for each
N ∈ N, any symmetric randomized distributed open-loop Nash equilibrium of the N -player game can
be identified with a symmetric distributed open-loop Nash equilibrium (non-randomized). Moreover, the
strategies associated to such equilibria can be described by controls which are feedback with respect to
the individual states. We call these actions distributed Markov strategies. The latter are determined by
the solutions of a coupled system of first order PDEs analogous to the mean field game PDE system; see
Eq. (MFGN ) in Subsection 4.2. This is in contrast with N -player Nash equilibria defined over Markov
feedback strategies with full state information, which are determined through a system of N coupled
PDEs. Building on the equivalence of characterizations and the convergence result in Theorem 3.1, we
also establish in Theorem 4.1 the convergence of solutions of (MFGN ) to solutions of (MFG), as well
as the convergence of the Nash equilibria in distributed Markov strategies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the N -player games together
with some notation and our standing assumptions. Existence of Nash equilibria in randomized distributed
open-loop strategies is verified in Proposition 2.1. In Section 3, the associated mean field game is intro-
duced in Lagrangian form; see Definition 3.1 and Proposition 3.1. We show convergence of symmetric
N -player randomized distributed open-loop Nash equilibria to the mean field game limit in Theorem 3.1.
Section 4 links, under additional assumptions, the mean field game in Lagrangian form with the mean
field game PDE system. Similarly, N -player Nash equilibria in distributed Markov strategies are de-
scribed in terms of a PDE system analogous to the limit system, but dependent on the number of players
N . The corresponding convergence results are given in Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1, respectively.
2. The N-player game
Before introducing the N -player deterministic differential game that we are interested in, let us first fix
some notations. Given a Polish space (X, dX), we denote by P(X) the set of probability measures over
X . If (Y, dY ) is another Polish space and ϕ : X → Y a Borel measurable function, then the push-forward
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ϕ♯m ∈ P(Y ) of a measure m ∈ P(X) by ϕ is defined by
(2.1) ϕ♯m(A) := m(ϕ−1(A)) ∀ A ∈ B(Y ),
where B(Y ) denotes the σ-algebra of Borel sets in Y . Given p ∈ [1,+∞) we denote by Pp(X) the set of
probability measures µ over X such that
∫
X
dX(x, x0)
pdµ(x) < +∞ for some x0 ∈ X . The set Pp(X) is
endowed with the Monge-Kantorovich distance dp : Pp(X)× Pp(X)→ [0,∞) defined by
dp(µ1, µ2) := inf
{(∫
X×X
dpX(x, y)dγ(x, y)
) 1
p
| γ ∈ P(X ×X), π1♯γ = µ1, π2♯γ = µ2
}
,
where πi : X ×X → X (i = 1, 2) is the projection on the i-th coordinate, that is, πi(x1, x2) := xi. It is
well known (see e.g. [37]) that in the particular case p = 1 we have
(2.2) d1(µ1, µ2) = sup
{∫
X
f(x)d (µ1 − µ2) (x) | f ∈ Lip1(X)
}
,
where Lip1(X) denotes the set of Lipschitz functions on X with Lipschitz constant equal to one.
We will fix as data some functions ℓ : Rd ×Rd ×P1(Rd)→ R, Φ : Rd ×P1(Rd)→ R and a probability
measure m0 ∈ P(Rd). The functions ℓ, Φ will represent running and terminal costs, respectively, while
m0 will be an initial state distribution. We will assume that:
(A1) (i) The functions ℓ and Φ are continuous. Moreover, the following properties hold true:
(i.1) For every (x, µ) ∈ Rd × P1(Rd), the function ℓ(·, x, µ) is convex.
(i.2) There exist q > 1, cℓ > 0, cℓ > 0 and Cℓ > 0 such that
(2.3) cℓ|α|
q − Cℓ ≤ ℓ(α, x, µ) ≤ cℓ|α|
q + Cℓ ∀ α ∈ R
d, x ∈ Rd, µ ∈ P1(R
d),
where we denote by | · | the Eulidean norm in Rd.
(i.3) The function Φ is bounded from below.
(ii) The support of m0, denoted by supp(m0), is a compact subset of R
d.
Choose T > 0, the finite time horizon, and set Γ := C([0, T ];Rd), the space of continuous Rd-valued
trajectories on [0, T ]. The space Γ is naturally endowed with the topology of uniform convergence. Let
W 1,q([0, T ];Rd) denote the Sobolev space of Rd-valued absolutely continuous functions that possess first
order weak sense partial derivatives in Lq((0, T );Rd).
In order to introduce the game that we will consider, assume first that there are N individuals (N ≥ 2),
which, from now on, will be called players, positioned at x1, . . . , xN ∈ Rd at time t = 0. For i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
player i chooses a trajectory γi ∈ A(xi), where
A(x) :=
{
γ ∈ Γ
∣∣ γ ∈W 1,q([0, T ];Rd) and γ(0) = x} , x ∈ Rd.
Given these initial positions, the cost jNi :
∏N
j=1A(xj)→ R for player i is defined by
(2.4) jNi (γ1, . . . , γN ) :=
∫ T
0
ℓ (γ˙i(t), γi(t), (γj(t))j 6=i) dt+Φ(γi(T ), (γj(T ))j 6=i) ,
where, for notational convenience, we have denoted
ℓ (γ˙i(t), γi(t), (γj(t))j 6=i) := ℓ
γ˙i(t), γi(t), 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δγj(t)
 , with the same convention for Φ.
Assumption (A1) implies that jNi is well-defined. Note that defining
(2.5) jN (γ1; (γj)
N
j=2) :=
∫ T
0
ℓ
(
γ˙1(t), γ1(t), (γj(t))
N
j=2
)
dt+Φ
(
γ1(T ), (γj(T ))
N
j=2
)
,
we have that jNi (γ1, . . . , γN) = j
N (γi; (γj)j 6=i).
In the game that we will consider, the initial position of each player is random, independent of the
initial positions of the other players and with the same law m0. In this new context, we define the set of
distributed open-loop strategies of the players as
A :=
{
γ : Rd → Γ
∣∣ γ is Borel measurable and γ(x) ∈ A(x) for all x ∈ supp(m0)} .
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For notational simplicity, for γ ∈ A, we will write γx := γ(x). Given a profile of actions (γ1, . . . , γN ) ∈ AN ,
it is natural to define the cost that it induces on player i as the mean with respect to the initial conditions
of costs having the form (2.4). Namely, the cost function JNi : A
N → R for player i is defined as
JNi (γ1, . . . , γN ) :=
∫
(Rd)N
jNi (γ
x1
1 , . . . , γ
xN
N )⊗
N
j=1 dm0(xj).
Recalling (2.5) and defining
(2.6) JN (γ1; (γj)
N
j=2) :=
∫
(Rd)N
jN (γx11 ; (γ
xj
j )
N
j=2)⊗
N
j=1 dm0(xj),
we have JNi (γ1, . . . , γN ) = J
N (γi; (γj)j 6=i) for all i = 1, . . . , N . In particular, the costs are symmetric, i.e.
for every permutation σ : {1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . , N}, we have that
JNi (γ1, . . . , γN ) = J
N
σ(i)(γσ(1), . . . , γσ(N)).
Let us recall the classical notion of Nash equilibrium when applied to the game defined by the N players,
the action set A (which is the same for all players) and the individual costs (Ji)Ni=1.
Definition 2.1. We say that (γ1,N , . . . , γN,N) ∈ AN is a Nash equilibrium in distributed open-loop
strategies if
(2.7) JN (γi,N ; (γj,N )j 6=i) ≤ J
N (γ; (γj,N )j 6=i) ∀ γ ∈ A, i = 1, . . . , N.
The existence of a Nash equilibrium for this symmetric game is not immediate because of the lack of
compactness of the set A. The following simple result shows that the time derivatives of the strategies
in a Nash equilibrium configuration (provided that it exists) enjoy a uniform boundedness property in
Lq((0, T );Rd). This fact will allow us to reduce the set of action strategies in Definition 2.1.
Lemma 2.1. Assume that (A1) holds and that (γ1,N , . . . , γN,N) ∈ AN is a Nash equilibrium. Then,
there exists a constant C > 0, independent of N , such that
(2.8)
∫ T
0
|γ˙xi,N (t)|
qdt ≤ C for m0-a.e. x ∈ Rd, i = 1, . . . , N.
Proof. Fix i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and define ji :W 1,q([0, T ];Rd)→ R as
ji(γ) =
∫ T
0
ℓi(γ˙(t), γ(t), t)dt+Φi(γ(T )),
where ℓi : R
d × Rd × [0, T ]→ R and Φi : Rd → R are defined by
(2.9)
ℓi(α, x, t) :=
∫
R(N−1)×d
ℓ
(
α, x, (γ
xj
j,N (t))j 6=i
)
⊗j 6=i dm0(xj),
Φi(x) :=
∫
R(N−1)×d
Φ
(
x, (γ
xj
j,N (T ))j 6=i
)
⊗j 6=i dm0(xj).
By Fubini’s theorem, and (2.7), for all γ ∈ A we have
(2.10) JN (γi,N ; (γj,N )j 6=i) =
∫
Rd
ji(γ
x
i,N )dm0(x) ≤ J
N (γ; (γj,N )j 6=i) =
∫
Rd
ji(γ
x)dm0(x).
For x ∈ Rd define
SNi (x) := argmin {ji(γ) | γ ∈ A(x)} ⊆ Γ.
Assumption (A1) implies that ji is lower semicontinuous, w.r.t. the weak topology in W
1,q([0, T ];Rd)
(see e.g. [22, Corollary 3.24]). Using this fact, the direct method in the Calculus of Variations and the
first inequality in (2.3), we obtain that SNi (x) 6= ∅ for all x ∈ R
d.
Claim: The set-valued map Rd ∋ x⇒ SNi (x) ∈ 2
Γ takes closed values and is upper semicontinuous, i.e.
for all closed sets M ⊆ Γ we have that {x ∈ Rd | SNi (x) ∩M 6= ∅} is closed.
Let us assume for a moment that the claim is true. Then, as a consequence of its second statement, the set
valued map SNi is Borel measurable and, hence, by the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem
(see e.g. [1, Theorem 18.13]) we have the existence of a Borel measurable function Rd ∋ x 7→ γˆ(x) ∈ Γ
such that γˆ(x) ∈ SNi (x) for all x ∈ R
d. Since γˆ ∈ A, relation (2.10) implies that γxi,N ∈ S
N
i (x) for
m0-almost every x ∈ Rd. Taking x ∈ Rd such that γxi,N ∈ S
N
i (x), we have that ji(γ
x
i,N ) ≤ ji(γ¯
x), where
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γ¯x(t) := x for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Assumption (A1) implies that j1(γ¯x) is bounded by a constant, which is
uniform for x ∈ supp(m0) and independent of N . Using this fact, the first inequality in (2.3) easily yields
(2.8).
It remains to prove the claim. First note that if (γxn) is a sequence in S
N
i (x) converging to γ
x uniformly
in [0, T ], then, by the first inequality in (2.3), the sequence (γ˙xn) is bounded in L
q([0, T ];Rd). If g is a
weak limit point of (γ˙xn) in L
q([0, T ];Rd), then, passing to the limit along a subsequence in the relation
γxn(t) = x +
∫ t
0 γ˙
x
n(s)ds for all t ∈ [0, T ], we get that γ
x ∈ W 1,q([0, T ];Rd), with γ˙x = g, and, hence,
the whole sequence (γ˙xn) converges weakly to γ˙
x in Lq([0, T ];Rd). Using this fact and the weak lower
semicontinuity of ji in W
1,q([0, T ];Rd), we obtain that γx ∈ SNi (x) and, hence, S
N
i (x) is closed in Γ.
In order to show that SNi is upper semicontinuous, let M be a closed subset of Γ and let (xn) be a
sequence in {x ∈ Rd | SNi (x) ∩M 6= ∅} converging to some x¯ ∈ R
d. Then, by definition, there exists
γxnn ∈ S
N
i (xn) ∩ M . Arguing as before, using the first inequality in (2.3), we obtain that (γ˙
xn
n ) is
bounded in Lq([0, T ];Rd). This implies that, up to some subsequence, γxnn converge uniformly to some
γx¯ ∈ W 1,q([0, T ];Rd) and γ˙xn → γ˙x¯ weakly in Lq([0, T ];Rd). Using that M is closed, w.r.t. the uniform
convergence, we get that γx¯ ∈M . On the other hand, noticing that
ji(γ
xn
n ) ≤ ji(γ
xn) ∀ γxn ∈ A(xn),
and the fact that any γ ∈ A(x¯) satisfies γ − x¯ + xn ∈ A(xn), the weak lower semicontinuity of ji yields
that ji(γ
x¯) ≤ ji(γ) ∀ γ ∈ A(x¯), i.e, γx¯ ∈ SNi (x¯)∩M , and, hence, x¯ ∈ {x ∈ R
d | SNi (x)∩M 6= ∅}, which
implies that the latter set is closed.

Now, we focus our attention on the existence of Nash equilibria for the described game. Using Lemma
2.1, a reformulation of the set of admissible strategies and cost functionals of the N -players game will be
useful. Let C > 0 be given by Lemma 2.1 and define the set
QC :=
{
γ ∈W 1,q([0, T ];Rd) |
∫ T
0
|γ˙(t)|qdt ≤ C, γ(0) ∈ supp(m0)
}
.
Since supp(m0) is compact, Ho¨lder’s inequality yields the existence of a compact set KC ⊆ Rd such that
(2.11) γ(t) ∈ KC for all t ∈ [0, T ], γ ∈ QC .
Using this fact and arguing as in the proof of Lemma 2.1, we have that QC is compact as a subset of Γ,
that is, when it is endowed with the topology of uniform convergence.
Given γi ∈ A, let us set mi := γi♯m0 ∈ P(Γ). By (2.1), for any profile of strategies (γi)Ni=1 ∈ A
N , the
cost for player i is given by
(2.12) JN (γi; (γj)j 6=i) =
∫
ΓN
jN (γ˜i; (γ˜j)j 6=i)⊗
N
j=1 dmj(γ˜j).
This expression for the cost motivates a relaxation of the game with strategies in A by considering
strategies taking values in P(Γ). Let us define the set Arel of randomized distributed open-loop strategies
by
(2.13) Arel := {m ∈ P(Γ) | e0♯m = m0, supp(m) ⊆ QC} ,
where, for each t ∈ [0, T ], et : Γ→ Rd is defined by et(γ) := γ(t).
Lemma 2.2. The set Arel is convex and compact as a subset of P(Γ).
Proof. Convexity follows directly from the definition. On the other hand, since Arel ⊆ P(QC) and P(QC)
is compact as a subset of P(Γ) (because QC is a compact subset of Γ), it suffices to check that Arel is
closed in P(Γ), but this follows directly from [3, Proposition 5.1.8] and the fact that QC is closed.

Remark 2.1. For later use, note that if m ∈ Arel, then [0, T ] ∋ t→ et♯m ∈ P1(R
d) is well-defined and,
by (2.2), belongs to C([0, T ];P1(Rd)). Moreover, since supp(m) ⊆ QC, we easily check that there exists
C′ > 0, independent of m ∈ Arel, such that
d1(et♯m, es♯m) ≤ C
′|t− s|
1
q′ ∀ s, t ∈ [0, T ].
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Therefore, by (2.11), [3, Proposition 7.1.5] and Lemma 2.2, the set {[0, T ] ∋ t → et♯m ∈ P1(Rd) | m ∈
Arel} is compact in C([0, T ];P1(Rd)).
Motivated by (2.12), we introduce the new relaxed game which has Arel as set of strategies for each
player and, given a strategy profile (mj)
N
j=1 ⊆ A
N
rel, the cost for player i is given by
JNrel(mi; (mj)j 6=i) :=
∫
QN
C
jN (γi; (γj)j 6=i)⊗
N
j=1 dmj(γj).
Note that the this game is still symmetric. In this framework, a profile of strategies (m1,N , . . . ,mN,N) ∈
ANrel is called a Nash equilibrium in randomized distributed open-loop strategies if
(2.14) JNrel(mi,N ; (mj,N )j 6=i) ≤ J
N
rel(m; (mj,N )j 6=i) ∀ m ∈ Arel, i = 1, . . . , N.
Proposition 2.1. Under assumption (A1), there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in randomized
distributed open-loop strategies having the form (mN , . . . ,mN ) ∈ ANrel.
Proof. It suffices to show the existence of a fixed point of the following set-valued map
Arel ∋ µ⇒ S
N (µ) := argmin
{
JNrel(µ
′, µ, . . . , µ)
∣∣ µ′ ∈ Arel} ⊆ Arel.
First note that, as a consequence of [3, Lemma 5.1.7], for every µ ∈ Arel the map Arel ∋ µ′ →
JNrel(µ
′, µ, . . . , µ) ∈ R is lower semicontinuous. Thus, the compactness of Arel yields that SN (µ) 6= ∅
for all µ ∈ Arel. A similar argument implies that SN (µ) is closed for all µ ∈ Arel. Notice also that SN (µ)
is convex for all µ ∈ Arel. Let us show that SN is upper semicontinuous. Consider a closed set M ⊆ Arel
and a sequence (µn) in {µ ∈ Arel | SN (µ) ∩M 6= ∅} converging to some µ¯ ∈ Arel. By definition, there
exists νn ∈M such that
(2.15) JNrel(νn;µn, . . . , µn) ≤ J
N
rel(µ
′;µn, . . . , µn) ∀ µ
′ ∈ Arel.
Since M is compact (because Arel is compact), there exists ν¯ ∈ M such that, up to some subsequence,
νn → ν¯ narrowly. By [9, Theorem 3.2] and (A1) for all µ′ ∈ Arel we have that JNrel(µ
′;µn, . . . , µn)
converges to JNrel(µ
′; µ¯, . . . , µ¯). On the other hand, by [22, Theorem 3.23] and (A1), the function QNC ∋
(γ1, . . . , γN ) → jN (γ1; (γj)j≥2) ∈ R is lower semi-continuous, which, using [3, Lemma 5.1.7] again,
implies that JNrel(ν¯; µ¯, . . . , µ¯) ≤ lim infn→∞ J
N
rel(νn;µn, . . . , µn). Therefore, passing to the limit in (2.15)
we obtain that
JNrel(ν¯; µ¯, . . . , µ¯) ≤ J
N
rel(µ
′; µ¯, . . . , µ¯) ∀ µ′ ∈ Arel,
i.e. ν¯ ∈ SN (µ¯)∩M , which implies the closedness {µ ∈ Arel | SN (µ)∩M 6= ∅} and the upper semicontinuity
of SN . Using the properties above, the existence of a fixed point for SN follows from the Kakutani-Fan-
Glicksberg fixed-point theorem (see e.g. [1, Corollary 17.55]). 
Corollary 2.1. Let (mN , . . . ,mN ) ∈ ANrel be a Nash equilibrium for the game defined by the cost J
N
rel
and the set of strategies Arel. Define ℓˆ : Rd × Rd × [0, T ]→ R and Φˆ : Rd → R by
(2.16)
ℓˆ(α, x, t) :=
∫
Q
N−1
C
ℓ
(
α, x, (γj(t))
N
j=2
)
⊗Nj=2 dmN (γj),
Φˆ(x) :=
∫
Q
N−1
C
Φ
(
x, (γj(T ))
N
j=2
)
⊗Nj=2 dmN (γj),
and assume that for m0-almost every x ∈ Rd the optimization problem
(2.17) inf
{∫ T
0
ℓˆ(γ˙(t), γ(t), t)dt+ Φˆ(γ(T ))
∣∣ γ ∈ QC , γ(0) = x
}
,
admits a unique solution. Then, there exists γN ∈ A such that mN = γN ♯m0. Moreover, γN is m0-
uniquely determined.
In particular, (γN , . . . , γN ) ∈ AN is a Nash equilibrium in distributed open-loop strategies.
Proof. Define ĵ : QC → R by
(2.18) ĵ(γ) :=
∫ T
0
ℓˆ(γ˙(t), γ(t), t)dt+ Φˆ(γ(T )).
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By definition of Nash equilibrium and Fubini’s theorem, for all m ∈ Arel we have that
(2.19) JNrel(mN ;mN , . . . ,mN ) =
∫
QC
ĵ(γ)dmN (γ) ≤ J
N
rel(m;mN , . . . ,mN ) =
∫
QC
ĵ(γ)dm(γ).
By the desintegration theorem (see e.g. [3, Theorem 5.3.1]), there exists a Borel family {mxN | x ∈ R
d} ⊆
P(QC), such that mxN ({γ ∈ QC | γ(0) = x}) = 1, for m0-almost every x ∈ R
d, and
(2.20)
∫
QC
ĵ(γ)dmN (γ) =
∫
Rd
∫
QC
ĵ(γ)dmxN (γ)dm0(x).
Define the set-valued function SˆN : Rd → 2Γ by
SˆN (x) := argmin
{
ĵ(γ) | γ ∈ A(x),
∫ T
0
|γ˙(t)|q ≤ C
}
.
Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 2.1, we have the existence of a Borel measurable selection Rd ∋ x 7→
γxN ∈ Sˆ
N (x), which, by assumption, is m0-uniquely determined. Moreover, by definition, γN ∈ A. Now,
let us define mˆ := γN ♯m0 ∈ Arel. Then, by (2.19), taking m = mˆ, and (2.20), we have that∫
Rd
[∫
QC
ĵ(γ)dmxN (γ)− ĵ(γ
x
N )
]
dm0(x) ≤ 0.
Since the integrand in the expression above is non-negative, by definition of γxN , we deduce that ĵ(γ
x
N ) =∫
QC
ĵ(γ)dmxN (γ) for m0-a.e. x ∈ R
d, and, hence, ĵ(γ) = ĵ(γxN ) for m
x
N -a.e. γ ∈ QC . Since, by
assumption, SˆN (x) = {γxN} for m0-a.e. x ∈ R
d, we deduce that mxN = δγxN for m0-a.e. x ∈ R
d, hence
mN = γN ♯m0. The result follows. 
Remark 2.2. An example of application of Corollary 2.1 is provided in Section 4.2 below.
3. Convergence to a mean field game equilibrium
In this section, we study the limit behavior, as N → ∞, of symmetric Nash equilibria in randomized
distributed open-loop strategies. The existence of such Nash equilibria is ensured by Proposition 2.1. We
begin by defining the limit object, i.e. the MFG equilibrium. Then we will prove that any cluster point
of the sequence (mN ) is a MFG equilibrium.
Let us define J :W 1,q([0, T ];Rd)× P1(Γ)→ R by
J(γ,m) :=
∫ T
0
ℓ(γ˙(t), γ(t), et♯m)dt+Φ(γ(T ), eT ♯m).
It is straightforward to check that m ∈ P1(Γ) implies that et♯m ∈ P1(Rd) for all t ∈ [0, T ], which implies
that J is well-defined.
Following the terminology in [35], we consider next the notion of Lagrangian MFG equilibrium (see
e.g. [16, 8, 17, 10]).
Definition 3.1. We say that m∗ ∈ P1(Γ) is a Lagrangian MFG equilibrium if e0♯m∗ = m0 and
(3.1) supp(m∗) ⊆
{
γ ∈ W 1,q([0, T ];Rd) | J(γ,m∗) ≤ J(γ
′,m∗) ∀ γ
′ ∈W 1,q([0, T ];Rd), γ′(0) = γ(0)
}
.
Reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 2.1, assumption (A1) implies that if m∗ is a Lagrangian MFG
equilibrium, then supp(m∗) ⊆ QC and, hence, m∗ ∈ Arel. Thus, m∗ is a Lagrangian MFG if and only if
m∗ ∈ Arel, e0♯m∗ = m0 and
(3.2) supp(m∗) ⊆ {γ ∈ QC | J(γ,m∗) ≤ J(γ
′,m∗) ∀ γ
′ ∈ QC , γ
′(0) = γ(0)} .
We still denote by J the restriction of J to QC ×Arel and recall that QC , endowed with the topology of
uniform convergence, is a compact set. For later use, let us state the following simple results.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that (A1) holds. Then, the following assertions hold true:
(i) The relative topology on Arel, as a subset of P1(Γ), coincides with the topology induced by the narrow
convergence.
(ii) The function J is lower semicontinuous in QC ×Arel.
(iii) For all γ ∈ QC , the function J(γ, ·) is bounded, uniformly in γ, and continuous in Arel.
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Proof. Assertion (i) follows from the fact that both topologies coincide on P(QC), because QC is a
compact subset of Γ. In particular, if mn → m narrowly in Arel, then for all t ∈ [0, T ] we have that
(3.3) et♯mn → et♯m in P1(Rd).
Thus, assertion (ii) follows from (3.3), (A1) and the proof of [22, Theorem 3.23]. Assertion (iii) follows
directly from (2.3), (3.3) and dominated convergence. 
If m∗ is a Lagrangian MFG equilibrium, we will denote by {m
x
∗ | x ∈ R
d} the m0-uniquely determined
Borel family of probability measures on QC satisfying that m
x
∗(QC \A(x)) = 0 and dm∗(γ) = dm
x
∗(γ)⊗
dm0(x). The existence of such a family is ensured by the disintegration theorem (see e.g. [3, Theorem
5.3.1]). We have the following equivalent characterization of a Lagrangian MFG equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1. The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) The measure m∗ ∈ Arel is a Lagrangian MFG equilibrium.
(ii) For m0-a.e. x ∈ Rd we have that
(3.4) supp(mx∗) ⊆ S(x) := argmin
{
J(γ′,m∗) | γ′ ∈ A(x),
∫ T
0
|γ˙′(t)|q ≤ C
}
.
(iii) The following inequality holds true:
(3.5)
∫
QC
J(γ,m∗) dm∗(γ) ≤
∫
QC
J(γ,m∗) dm(γ) for all m ∈ Arel.
Proof. Let us prove the equivalence between (i) and (ii). Letm∗ ∈ Arel be a LagrangianMFG equilibrium.
If (3.4) does not hold, there exists A ∈ B(Rd), with m0(A) > 0, such that mx∗(S(x)
c) > 0 for all x ∈ A.
Define the set E := {γ ∈ QC | γ(0) ∈ A, γ ∈ S(γ(0))c} = e
−1
0 (A) ∩ {γ ∈ QC | γ ∈ S(γ(0))
c}. Arguing as
in the proof of the claim in Lemma 2.1, the set {γ ∈ QC | γ ∈ S(γ(0))} is closed in QC , which implies
that E ∈ B(QC). Since m∗(E) =
∫
A
mx∗(S(x)
c)dm0(x) > 0, we obtain a contradiction with (3.2).
Conversely, suppose that (ii) holds and that m∗ is not a Lagrangian MFG equilibrium. Then, defining
E′ := {γ ∈ QC | γ ∈ S(γ(0))c}, which is an open set and, hence, belongs to B(QC), we have that
0 < m∗(E
′) =
∫
Rd
∫
QC
IE′(γ)dm
x
∗(γ)dm0(x),
which is impossible because (3.4) implies that the r.h.s. above is equal to 0.
Let us now prove that (ii) ⇔ (iii). Notice that
(3.6)
∫
QC
J(γ,m∗) dm∗(γ) =
∫
Rd
∫
QC
J(γ,m∗)dm
x
∗(γ)dm0(x).
Analogously, given m ∈ Arel, we disintegrate it w.r.t. m0 and write dm(γ) = dmx(γ) ⊗ dm0(x), where
{mx | x ∈ Rd} is a m0-uniquely determined Borel family of probability measures on QC such that
mx(QC \ A(x)) = 0 for m0-a.e. x ∈ Rd. Thus,
(3.7)
∫
QC
J(γ,m∗) dm(γ) =
∫
Rd
∫
QC
J(γ,m∗)dm
x(γ)dm0(x).
If (ii) holds, then for m0-a.e. x ∈ R
d and mx∗-a.e. γ ∈ QC we have
(3.8) J(γ,m∗) ≤ J(γ
′,m∗) ∀ γ′ ∈ A(x) ∩QC .
Integrating both sides of (3.8), first with respect to dmx(γ′) and then with respect to dmx∗(γ), and using
(3.6)-(3.7) we obtain (3.5). Conversely, using the notations introduced above, suppose that (3.5) holds
and let γˆ ∈ A be a Borel measurable selection of S (the existence of such selection can be justified
arguing exactly as in the proof of Lemma 2.1). Then, taking the measure m ∈ Arel defined by dm(γ) =
dδγˆx(γ)⊗ dm0(x) in (3.5) and using (3.6), we deduce that∫
QC
J(γ,m∗)dm
x
∗(γ) = J(γ
x,m∗) for m0-a.e. x ∈ R
d,
and, hence, mx∗-almost every γ belongs to S(x). The conclusion follows. 
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Now, consider the symmetric N -player game defined in Section 2, with randomized distributed open-
loop strategies, and let (mN , . . . ,mN ) ∈ ANrel be a symmetric equilibrium. Our main result in this section,
stated in the next theorem, shows that any limit point of this sequence is a Lagrangian MFG equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that (A1) holds. Then any limit point m∗ of (mN )N∈N (there exist at least one)
is a Lagrangian MFG equilibrium. Moreover, if (mNk)k∈N is a subsequence of (mN )N∈N converging to
m∗, then supt∈[0,T ] d1 (et♯mNk , et♯m∗)→ 0 as k →∞.
Proof. We only prove the first assertion, since, having this result, the second one follows directly from
Remark 2.1. For N ≥ 2, let Y N1 , . . . , Y
N
N be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) QC-valued
random variables with common distribution mN defined on some probability space (ΩN ,FN ,PN ). We
denote by EN the expectation with respect to PN . For i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, let µN,i denote the (random)
empirical measure of Y N1 , . . . , Y
N
N excluding Y
N
i , that is,
µN,i(ω) :=
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δY N
j
(ω) ∈ P(QC) ∀ ω ∈ ΩN .
Notice that Y Ni and µ
N,i are independent for every i, while µN,1, . . . , µN,N are identically distributed (not
independent in general) with common distribution depending on N . Moreover, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(3.9) JNrel(mN ;mN , . . . ,mN ) = EN
[
J
(
Y Ni , µ
N,i
)]
.
Let (mNk)k∈N be a converging subsequence of (mN )N∈N with limit m∗ for some m∗ ∈ Arel. The existence
of such a subsequence follows from the compactness of Arel. Let us prove that (µ
Nk,1)k∈N converges in
distribution to the deterministic limit m∗. Let T ⊂ Cb(QC) be countable and measure determining (or
separating). Thus, T is a countable collection of bounded continuous functions on QC such that two
probability measures ν, ν˜ ∈ P(QC) are equal whenever
∫
ψ dν =
∫
ψ dν˜ for all ψ ∈ T . Observe that T
can be chosen countable since QC is a Polish space, hence separable, under the supremum norm topology.
For ψ ∈ T set
mNψ :=
∫
QC
ψ(γ) dmN (γ), v
N
ψ := EN
[(∫
QC
ψ(γ) dµN,1(γ)−mNψ
)2]
.
By construction and symmetry, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
mNψ = EN
[∫
QC
ψ(γ) dµN,i(γ)
]
= EN
[
ψ(Y Ni )
]
, vNψ = EN

 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
ψ(Y Nj )−m
N
ψ
2
 .
Since Y N1 , . . . , Y
N
N are independent and the functions in T are bounded, it follows that
(3.10) vNψ =
1
(N − 1)2
N∑
j=2
EN
[(
ψ(Y Nj )−m
N
ψ
)2] N→∞
−→ 0 for every ψ ∈ T .
Moreover, considering the subsequence (mNk)k∈N, we have that
(3.11) mNkψ
k→∞
−→
∫
QC
ψ(γ) dm∗(γ) =: m
∗
ψ for every ψ ∈ T .
Since P(QC) is compact, the set P(P(QC)) is also compact. Thus, there exists a sub-subsequence
(Nkl)l∈N such that (µ
Nkl ,1)l∈N converges in distribution to µ for some P(QC)-valued random variable µ
defined on some probability space (Ω,F ,P). We denote by E the expectation under P. Then, by the
continuous mapping theorem (see e.g. [9, Theorem 5.1]) and (3.11), we have that
lim
l→∞
v
Nkl
ψ = E
[(∫
QC
ψ(γ) dµ(γ)−m∗ψ
)2]
for every ψ ∈ T .
On the other hand, thanks to (3.10), liml→∞ v
Nkl
ψ = 0. It follows that for every ψ ∈ T ,∫
QC
ψ(γ) dµ(γ) = m∗ψ =
∫
QC
ψ(γ) dm∗(γ) P-almost surely.
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Since T is countable, we have the existence of A ∈ F such that P(A) = 1 and for every ω ∈ A,∫
QC
ψ(γ) dµω(γ) =
∫
QC
ψ(γ) dm∗(γ) for all ψ ∈ T .
Since T is measure determining, we find that
µω = m∗ for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω.
As we can always choose converging (sub-)subsequences, we deduce that (µNk,1)k∈N converges in distri-
bution to m∗. By independence of Y
Nk
1 and µ
Nk,1, and using [9, Theorem 3.2], we find that(
Y Nk1 , µ
Nk,1
)
♯PNk = mNk ⊗
(
µNk,1
)
♯PNk
k→∞
−→ m∗ ⊗ δm∗ .
This implies, thanks to (3.9), Lemma 3.1(ii) and [3, Lemma 5.1.7], that
(3.12) lim inf
k→∞
JNkrel (mNk ;mNk , . . . ,mNk) = lim inf
k→∞
ENk
[
J
(
Y Nk1 , µ
Nk,1
)]
≥
∫
QC
J(γ,m∗) dm∗(γ).
Let m ∈ Arel. By Lemma 3.1(iii) and dominated convergence, it follows that
(3.13) JNkrel (m;mNk , . . . ,mNk) =
∫
QC
ENk
[
J
(
γ, µNk,1
)]
dm(γ)
k→∞
−→
∫
QC
J(γ,m∗) dm(γ).
Passing to the limit in the Nash equilibrium inequality
JNkrel (mNk ;mNk , . . . ,mNk) ≤ J
Nk
rel (m;mNk , . . . ,mNk),
and using (3.12)-(3.13), we obtain that (3.5) holds. The result now follows from Proposition 3.1. 
Remark 3.1. In particular, under assumption (A1), Theorem 3.1 ensures the existence of at least one
Lagrangian MFG equilibrium.
4. The first order Mean Field Game system
In this section, we first discuss, following [16], the relation between the notion of Lagrangian MFG
equilibrium and the first order PDE system introduced by Lasry and Lions in [34, Section 2.5] for some
particular data. Next, in Section 4.2, we consider symmetric randomized distributed open-loop Nash
equilibria for the N -player game, which, thanks to Corollary 2.1 and Assumption (A2) below, can
be identified with symmetric distributed open-loop Nash equilibria (non-randomized). Arguing as in
the MFG limit, we connect these equilibria with a first order PDE system which is similar to the one
appearing in the limit case. Consequently, analytic techniques can also be used in order study the limit
behavior of these equilibria as the number of players tends to infinity.
Let L : Rd × Rd → R, f , g : Rd × P1(Rd)→ R and m0 ∈ P1(Rd) satisfying that
(A2)(i) The function L belongs to C2(Rd × Rd), is bounded from below and
(i.1) there exist CL > 0, L > 0 such that
(4.1) L(α, x) ≤ L|α|2 + CL ∀ α, x ∈ R
d.
(i.2) There exist cL, c
′
L > 0 such that
(4.2)
∂2α,αL(α, x)(α
′, α′) ≥ cL|α′|2 ∀ α, α′ ∈ Rd, x ∈ Rd,
|∂xL(α, x)| ≤ c′L(1 + |α|
2) ∀ α, x ∈ Rd.
(ii) The functions f and g are continuous. Moreover, for every m ∈ P1(Rd) the functions f(·,m) and
g(·,m) belong to C2(Rd) and there exists a constant Cf,g > 0 such that
sup
m∈P1(Rd)
{‖f(·,m)‖C2 + ‖g(·,m)‖C2} ≤ Cf,g,
where, for h = f , g, we have set
‖h(·,m)‖C2 := sup
x∈Rd
|h(x,m)|+
d∑
i=1
|∂xih(x,m)|+
d∑
i,j=1
|∂xi,xjh(x,m)|
 .
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(iii) The measure m0 is absolutely continuous w.r.t. to the Lebesgue measure Ld, with density still de-
noted by m0, and has a compact support.
A typical example of function L satisfying (A2)(i) is given by Rd×Rd ∋ (α, x)→ L(α, x) := b1(x)|α|2+
b2(x), where, for i = 1, 2, bi ∈ C2(Rd), bi is Lipschitz, and there exist constants b1 > 0, b2 ∈ R and bi > 0
such that bi ≤ bi ≤ bi.
Remark 4.1. (i) Assumption (A2)(i) above implies the convexity of L(·, x) and the existence of L, C′L,
c
′′
L > 0 such that
(4.3)
L(α, x) ≥ L|α|2 − C′L ∀ α, x ∈ R
d,
|∂αL(α, x)| ≤ c
′′
L(1 + |α|) ∀ α, x ∈ R
d.
(ii) For x ∈ Rd let us denote by H(·, x) the convex conjugate of L(·, x). The bound in (i.1) and the first
bound in (4.3) imply the exitence of constants H, H and CH > 0 such that
(4.4) H |ξ|2 − CH ≤ H(ξ, x) ≤ H|ξ|
2 + CH ∀ ξ, x ∈ R
d.
(iii) By the first estimate in (4.2) we have that ∂ξH(ξ, x) is characterized as the unique solution α(ξ, x)
of the optimization problem maxα∈Rd{ξ ·α−L(α, x)}. As a consequence of this fact and the first relation
in (4.3), we obtain the existence of cH > 0 such that
(4.5) |∂ξH(ξ, x)| ≤ cH(1 + |ξ|) ∀ ξ, x ∈ R
d.
Moreover, from the convexity of L(x, ·), for all ξ, x ∈ Rd we have that ∂ξH(ξ, x) is the unique solution to
(4.6) ∂αL(∂ξH(ξ, x), x) = ξ.
Using the relation above, the regularity L ∈ C2(Rd × Rd), the first estimate in (4.2) and the implicit
function theorem, we obtain that Rd × Rd ∋ (ξ, x) → ∂ξH(ξ, x) ∈ Rd belongs to C1(Rd × Rd;Rd). Using
this fact, we get that Rd × Rd ∋ (ξ, x) 7→ ∂xH(ξ, x) = −∂xL(∂ξH(ξ, x), x) ∈ Rd is also of class C1. As a
consequence H is of class C2.
Let us define ℓ : Rd × Rd × P1(Rd)→ R and Φ : Rd × P1(Rd)→ R by
(4.7) ℓ (α, x, µ) := L(−α, x) + f(x, µ) and Φ(x, µ) := g(x, µ).
Clearly, Assumption (A2) implies that ℓ, Φ and m0 satisfy (A1).
4.1. Lagrangian MFG equilibria and the MFG PDE system. As pointed out in [16], under (A2)
the existence of a Lagrangian equilibrium for the MFG problem defined by ℓ, Φ and m0, is equivalent
the existence of a solution (u, ρ) of the following PDE system, which was first introduced in [34],
−∂tu+H(∇u, x) = f(x, ρ(t)) in Rd × (0, T ),
∂tρ− div (∂ξH(∇u, x)ρ) = 0 in Rd × (0, T ),
u(·, T ) = g(·, ρ(T )), ρ(0) = m0 in Rd.
 (MFG)
In the system above, u : Rd × [0, T ]→ R is a solution to the first equation, with the associated terminal
condition, if it is globally Lipschitz, locally semi-concave with respect to its first argument (see [12,
Section 2]), uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ], and the equation holds in the viscosity sense (see e.g. [4, Chapter III,
Section 3]). In (MFG), ∇u denotes a Borel measurable selection of the set-valued map
R
d × [0, T ] ∋ (x, t) 7→ D+x u(x, t) :=
{
p ∈ Rd | lim sup
x′→x
u(x′, t)− u(x, t)− p · (x′ − x)
|x′ − x|
≤ 0
}
⊆ Rd.
The existence of such measurable selection follows from the fact that the above set-valued map has a
closed graph (thanks to the semi-concavity property of u, see e.g. [12, Proposition 3.3.4]). Moreover,
since u is Lipschitz, ∇u(x, t) is uniformly bounded in (x, t) ∈ Rd × [0, T ].
The function ρ : [0, T ] → P(Rd) is a solution to the second equation, with the associated initial
condition, if ρ ∈ C([0, T ];P1(Rd)), and the equation is satisfied in the sense of distributions, i.e. for all
φ ∈ C∞(Rd) with compact support we have
(4.8)
∫
Rd
φ(x)dρ(t)(x) =
∫
Rd
φ(x)dm0(x)−
∫ t
0
∫
Rd
∂ξH(∇u(x, s), x) · ∇φ(x)dρ(s)(x)ds.
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Note that by the previous considerations, the second term in the right-hand-side of (4.8) is well-defined.
Any pair (u, ρ) satisfying (MFG) is called an equilibrium of the first order MFG problem.
For the sake of completeness, let us provide the main arguments that justify the equivalence between
both notions of equilibria. Let m∗ ∈ Arel be a Lagrangian MFG equilibrium. Let us define ρ : [0, T ] →
P(Rd) by ρ(t) := et♯m∗ for all t ∈ [0, T ], and the value function u : Rd × [0, T ]→ R by
(4.9) u(x, t) := inf
{∫ T
t
ℓ(γ˙(s), γ(s), ρ(s))ds +Φ(γ(T ), ρ(T ))
∣∣ γ ∈W 1,2([t, T ];Rd) and γ(t) = x } ,
for all (x, t) ∈ Rd × [0, T ]. Since m∗ ∈ Arel, we have that ρ ∈ C([0, T ];P1(Rd)). Using this fact,
assumption (A2) and [5, Proposition 1.1 and Remark 1.1], we obtain that u is a viscosity solution of
(4.10)
−∂tu+H(∇u, x) = f(x, ρ(t)) in Rd × (0, T ),
u(·, T ) = g(·, ρ(T )) in Rd.
Moreover, by [21, Theorem 2.1], the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation above admits a comparison prin-
ciple, which implies that u is its unique viscosity solution. We will need the following result, whose proof
follows from standard arguments.
Lemma 4.1. Under (A2) we have:
(i) For every (x, t) ∈ Rd × [0, T ] the set S(x, t) of paths γ∗ ∈ W 1,2([t, T ];Rd) such that γ∗(t) = x and
(4.11) u(x, t) =
∫ T
t
ℓ(γ˙∗(s), γ∗(s), ρ(s))ds+Φ(γ∗(T ), ρ(T ))
is non-empty. Moreover, there exists a constant C > 0, independent of (x, t), such that
(4.12) sup
s∈[t,T ], γ∗∈S(x,t)
|γ˙∗(s)| ≤ C.
(ii) The value function u is globally Lipschitz.
(iii) The value function u is locally semi-concave w.r.t. to the space variable, uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ].
More precisely, for any compact set K ⊆ Rd there exists a constant CK , independent of t, such that for
every λ ∈ [0, 1], x, y ∈ K, such that the segment [x, y] is contained in K, the following inequality holds
(4.13) λu(x, t) + (1− λ)u(y, t) ≤ u(λx+ (1 − λ)y) + CK
λ(1 − λ)
2
|x− y|2.
Proof. The proof being standard, we only sketch the main ideas. The fact that S(x, t) is non-empty
follows directly from (A2) and the direct method in the Calculus of Variations. Moreover, by (A2) and
arguing as in the proof of Lemma 2.1 we obtain the existence of c > 0, independent of (x, t, ρ), such that
(4.14)
u(x, t) = inf
{∫ T
t
ℓ(γ˙(s), γ(s), ρ(s))ds +Φ(γ(T ), ρ(T ))
∣∣ γ ∈W 1,2([0, T ];Rd), γ(t) = x,
and
∫ T
0
|γ˙(s)|2ds ≤ c
}
.
Using this fact, the Euler-Lagrange equation associated to any element γ∗ ∈ S(x, t), the second estimate
in (4.2) and arguing as in the proof of [12, Theorem 6.2.5], we easily obtain (4.12), which proves assertion
(i). In order to prove (ii), notice that (i) implies that the value function can also be written as
(4.15) u(x, t) = inf
{∫ T
t
ℓ
(
α(s), x+
∫ s
t
α(s′)ds′, ρ(s)
)
ds+Φ
(
x+
∫ T
t
α(s′)ds′, ρ(T )
) ∣∣ α ∈ AˆC
}
,
where AˆC :=
{
α ∈ L∞([0, T ];Rd) | ‖α‖L∞ ≤ C
}
. Using the estimate | infα∈AˆC A(α) − infα∈AˆC B| ≤
supα∈AˆC |A(α) − B(α)| for any functions A, B : L
∞([0, T ];Rd) → R, expression (4.7), the uniform
Lipschitz property for f and g in (A2)(ii), and the second estimate in (4.2), we easily obtain that
u(·, t) is globally Lipschitz, with a Lipschitz constant which is independent of t ∈ [0, T ]. Similarly, using
(4.15) and the estimate (4.1), we get that u(x, ·) is globally Lipschitz, with a Lipschitz constant which is
independent of x ∈ Rd. Assertion (ii) follows. Finally, assertion (iii) follows directly from [12, Theorem
6.4.1]. 
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Now, let us consider the set-valued map
R
d ∋ x 7→ S(x) := argmin
{∫ T
0
ℓ(γ˙(t), γ(t), ρ(t))dt +Φ(γ(T ), ρ(T ))
∣∣ γ ∈W 1,2([0, T ];Rd), γ(0) = x} .
Since Lemma 4.1(ii) implies that u(·, 0) is a.e. differentiable, [12, Corollary 6.4.10] yields that for a.e.
x ∈ Rd we have S(x) = {γ˜x} for some γ˜x ∈ A(x). Now, as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, let γ∗ ∈ A
be a Borel measurable selection of S. Then, for a.e. x ∈ Rd we have that γx∗ = γ˜
x. Thus, Proposition
3.1(ii) yields mx∗ = δγx∗ for a.e. x ∈ supp(m0) and, hence, m∗ = γ∗♯m0. In particular, ρ(t) = γ
(·)
∗ (t)♯m0
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
On the other hand, by [12, Theorem 6.4.9, Theorem 6.3.3 and Theorem 6.4.8], for a.e. x ∈ Rd, we
have
(4.16) γ˙x∗ (t) = −∂ξH (∇u(γ
x
∗ (t), t), γ
x
∗ (t)) ∀ t ∈ (0, T ), γ
x
∗ (0) = x,
where we underline that u is differentiable w.r.t. to its first argument at the point (γx∗ (t), t) if t ∈ (0, T )
(see [12, Theorem 6.4.7]). Denoting by still by ∇u a measurable selection of (x, t) 7→ D+x u(x, t), for every
φ ∈ C∞(Rd) with compact support and t ∈ [0, T ], we have∫
Rd
φ(x)dρ(t)(x) =
∫
Rd
φ(γx∗ (t))dm0(x)
=
∫
Rd
φ(x)dm0(x) −
∫
Rd
∫ t
0 ∂ξH (∇u(γ
x
∗ (s), s), γ
x
∗ (s))∇φ(γ
x
∗ (s))dsdm0(x),
=
∫
Rd
φ(x)dm0(x) −
∫ t
0
∫
Rd
∂ξH (∇u(x, s), x)∇φ(x)dρ(s)(x)ds,
which implies that ρ satisfies (4.8) and, hence, the couple (u, ρ) solves (MFG). Notice that under (A2)
a Lagrangian MFG equilibrium m∗ exists (see Remark 3.1) and, hence, the previous arguments show, in
particular, the existence of at least one solution (u, ρ) to (MFG).
Conversely, if (u, ρ) solves (MFG), then the first equation therein implies that u and ρ are still
related by (4.9). By the second equation in (MFG) and [3, Theorem 8.2.1], there exists a probabil-
ity measure m∗ ∈ P(Γ) such that ρ(t) = et♯m∗ for all t ∈ [0, T ] and, considering the disintegration
dm∗(γ) = dm
x
∗(γ)⊗dm0(x), for a.e. x ∈ supp(m0) the support of the measure m
x
∗ is contained in the set
of solutions of (4.16). By Lemma 4.1 and arguing as in the proof of [13, Lemma 4.11], we have that every
solution to (4.16) solves the optimization problem in the r.h.s. of (4.9) with t = 0. Thus, by Proposition
3.1(ii) we obtain that m∗ is a Lagrangian MFG equilibrium. Notice also that S(x) being a singleton for
a.e. x ∈ Rd, the previous argument shows, in particular, that [0, T ] ∋ t 7→ γ
(·)
∗ (t)♯m0 ∈ P1(Rd) is the
unique solution in C([0, T ];P1(Rd)) of the continuity equation
(4.17) ∂tρ− div (∂ξH(∇u, x)ρ) = 0 in R
d × (0, T ), ρ(0) = m0 in R
d.
In addition to the relation between Lagrangian MFG equilibria and the solutions of (MFG), assump-
tion (A2) has also consequences on the regularity of the time marginals {ρ(t) | t ∈ [0, T ]} as the following
result shows.
Proposition 4.1. In addition to (A2)(iii), assume that m0 ∈ Lp(Rd) for some p ∈ (1,+∞] and let
(u, ρ) be a solution to (MFG). Then, the following assertions hold true:
(i) There exists c1 > 0, independent of t ∈ [0, T ], such that supp(ρ(t)) ⊆ B(0, c1) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) For all t ∈ [0, T ] the measure ρ(t) is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure. Moreover,
the density of ρ(t), that we will still denote by ρ(t), belongs to Lp(Rd) and there exists a constant c2 > 0,
independent of p ∈ (1,+∞] and t ∈ [0, T ], such that
(4.18) ‖ρ(t)‖Lp ≤ c2‖m0‖Lp .
Proof. Assertion (i) follows directly from the formula ρ(t) = γ
(·)
∗ (t)♯m0, where γ
x
∗ ∈ S(x) for all x ∈ R
d,
Lemma 4.1(i) and the fact that supp(m0) is compact. In order to prove (ii), let β ∈ C∞(Rd), non-
negative, with support contained in the unit ball and such that
∫
Rd
β(x)dx = 1. For ε > 0, let us define
βε(x) := ε
−dβ(x/ε), uε(x, t) := (βε ∗ u(·, t)) (x) and consider the equation
(4.19) ∂tρε − div (∂ξH(∇uε, x)ρε) = 0 in R
d × (0, T ), ρε(0) = m0 in R
d.
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For every x ∈ Rd, let us define γxε ∈ C
1([0, T ];Rd) as the unique solution to
(4.20) γ˙xε (t) = −∂ξH (∇uε(γ
x
ε (t), t), γ
x
ε (t)) ∀ t ∈ (0, T ), γ
x
ε (0) = x.
By [3, Proposition 8.1.8], equation (4.19) admits a unique solution in C([0, T ];P1(Rd)), which is given by
ρε(t) := γ
(·)
ε (t)♯m0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, by a standard change of variable argument (see e.g. [2,
Section 2]), for every t ∈ [0, T ] we have that ρε(t) is absolutely continuous, with density given by
ρε(x, t) =
m0
(
[γ
(·)
ε (t)]−1(x)
)
∣∣∣det(Y ([γ(·)ε (t)]−1(x), t))∣∣∣ for a.e. x ∈ Rd,
where, for each y ∈ Rd, Y (y, ·) is defined as the unique solution to
Y˙ (t) = Lε(Y (t), t) t ∈ (0, T ), Y (0) = y,
with Rd × [0, T ] ∋ (x, t) 7→ Lε(x, t) ∈ Rd×d being given by
(4.21) Lε(x, t) := Dx [∂ξH (∇uε(x, t), x)] = ∂
2
ξ,ξH (∇uε(x, t), x) ∂
2
x,xuε(x, t) + ∂
2
ξ,xH (∇uε(x, t), x) .
Let us assume that p ∈ (1,+∞). By a change of variable again, we obtain that
(4.22) ‖ρε(t)‖
p
Lp =
∫
Rd
mp0(x) |det (Y (x, t))|
1−p
dx =
∫
supp(m0)
mp0(x) |det (Y (x, t))|
1−p
dx.
Now, for all x ∈ Rd and t ∈ [0, T ], we have (see [2, Section 2, estimate (2.4)])
(4.23)
|det (Y (x, t))|1−p ≤ exp
(
(p− 1)
∫ t
0
∥∥∥[div (−∂ξH(∇uε(·, s), ·))]−∥∥∥
L∞
ds
)
≤ exp
(
p
∫ T
0
∥∥[Tr (Lε(x, t))]+∥∥L∞ dt) ,
where [a]− := max{0,−a}, [a]+ = a + [a]− and for any a ∈ R, and Tr (Lε(x, t)) denotes the trace of
the matrix Lε(x, t). On the other hand, Lemma 4.1(ii), and the definition of uε, imply that ∇uε(x, t)
is bounded, uniformly in (x, t) ∈ Rd × [0, T ] and ε > 0. Moreover, by Lemma 4.1(iii), the compactness
of supp(m0) and the definition of uε(·, t) again, we can assume that uε(·, t) is uniformly semiconcave
in a bounded open set O containing supp(m0), i.e. uε(·, t) satisfies (4.13) for all x, y ∈ O, with CK
replaced by c˜, for some c˜ independent of t and ε small enough. By [12, Proposition 1.1.3], we have that
∂2xxuε(x, t) − c˜Id negative semidefinite for all (x, t) ∈ O × [0, T ] and, hence, using that ∂ξ,ξH(ξ, x) is
positive semidefinite for all ξ ∈ Rd and x ∈ Rd, there exists a constant cˆ > 0, independent of ε and t,
such that
Lε(x, t) := Dx [∂ξH (∇uε(x, t), x)] = ∂
2
ξ,ξH (∇uε(x, t), x) ∂
2
x,xuε(x, t) + ∂
2
ξ,xH (∇uε(x, t), x) − cˆId
is negative semidefinite for all x ∈ O. As a consequence, Tr(Lε(x, t)) is bounded from above by a constant
which is independent of ε > 0 small enough, x ∈ O, and t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus, by (4.23) and taking the power
1/p in (4.22), there exists c2 > 0, independent of ε, t and p, such that
(4.24) ‖ρε(t)‖Lp ≤ c2‖m0‖Lp ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
The previous estimate shows the existence of ρ˜ ∈ L∞([0, T ];Lp(Rd)) and a sequence (ρεn)n∈N such
that, as n → ∞, εn → 0 and ρεn → ρ˜ ∈ L
∞([0, T ];Lp(Rd)) in the weak* topology. By dominated
convergence, we have that ∂ξH(∇uεn , ·) → ∂ξH(∇u, ·) in L
1([0, T ];Ls(Rd)) for any s ∈ [1,+∞). As
a consequence, ρ˜ satisfies estimate (4.24) and, passing to the limit in (4.19), we get that the measure
[0, T ] ∋ t→ ρ˜(t)Ld ∈ Lp(Rd) satisfies (4.8). Using that [0, T ] ∋ t 7→ ρ(t) ∈ P1(Rd) is the unique solution
to (4.17) in C([0, T ];P1(Rd)), [3, Lemma 8.1.2] implies that ρ˜(t)Ld = ρ(t) for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus, for
a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], ρ(t) is absolutely continuous w.r.t. to the Lebesgue measure and estimate (4.18) holds for
its density. Using this fact and that ρ ∈ C([0, T ];P1(Rd)), the previous statement is valid in the whole
time interval [0, T ], which proves (ii) when p < +∞. Since c2 does not depend on p, assertion (ii) for
p =∞ follows by taking the limit in (4.18) when p→∞. 
Remark 4.2. Similar regularization techniques have been recently employed in [26], in order to establish
Lp-estimates for the time evolving distributions describing equilibria in optimal-exit MFGs.
ON THE ASYMPTOTIC NATURE OF FIRST ORDER MFGS 15
4.2. The N-player equilibria: associated time marginals and value functions. Let us consider
the game with N players defined in Section 2 with ℓ and Φ given by (4.7). Let (mN , . . . ,mN) ∈ ANrel
be a symmetric equilibrium in randomized distributed open-loop strategies for the N -player game. Note
that if for h = f , g we define
(4.25) hN (x, µ) :=
∫
(Rd)N−1
h
x, 1
N − 1
N∑
j=2
δxj
⊗Nj=2 dµ(xj) ∀ x ∈ Rd, µ ∈ P1(Rd),
we have that fN and gN satisfy the assumptions for f and g in (A2)(ii) (with the same constant Cf,g).
As a consequence of this fact, the results in [12, Chapter 6] and Corollary 2.1 we obtain the existence
of γN ∈ A such that mN = γN♯m0, i.e. (mN , . . . ,mN ) can be identified with the non-randomized
symmetric equilibrium in distributed open-loop strategies given by (γN , . . . , γN ) ∈ AN . Furthermore,
setting ρN(t) := et♯mN = γ
(·)
N (t)♯mN for all t ∈ [0, T ], we have that γ
x
N ∈ S
N (x) := SN (x, 0), where
SN (x, t) := argmin
{∫ T
t
[L(−γ˙(s), γ(s)) + fN (γ(s), ρN (s))] ds+ gN (γ(T ), ρN(T ))
∣∣
γ ∈ W 1,2([t, T ];Rd) and γ(t) = x
}
∀ x ∈ Rd, t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 4.3. (i) Recall that the representation mN = γN ♯m0 is only m0-uniquely determined. In
particular, if γ′N ∈ A is different from γN but coincides with it on a set A such that m0(A) = 1, then we
also have that mN = γ
′
N ♯m0. For the sake of simplicity, we have chosen to represent always mN via a
measurable selection γN of the set-valued map SN . Notice that (A2) and the results in [12, Chapter 6]
imply that γxN is uniquely defined for a.e. x ∈ R
d.
(ii) Exactly as in the limit case (see Lemma 4.1(i)), we have the existence of a constant C > 0, independent
of (x, t) and N ∈ N, such that
(4.26) sup
s∈[t,T ], γ∗∈SN (x,t)
|γ˙∗(s)| ≤ C ∀ x ∈ R
d, t ∈ [0, T ], N ∈ N.
As a consequence, there exists a compact set KC ⊆ R
d such that γxN (t) ∈ KC for all N ∈ N, x ∈ supp(m0)
and t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, the representation ρN (t) = et♯mN = γ
(·)
N (t) implies that supp(ρN (t)) ⊆ KC
for all N ∈ N and t ∈ [0, T ].
Let us define uN : R
d × [0, T ]→ R by
(4.27)
uN(x, t) := inf
{∫ T
t
[L(−γ˙(s), γ(s)) + fN (γ(s), ρN (s))] ds+ gN(γ(T ), ρN (T ))
∣∣
γ ∈ W 1,2([t, T ];Rd) and γ(t) = x
}
∀ x ∈ Rd, t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 4.4. Mimicking the proofs of Lemma 4.1 and [12, Theorem 6.4.1] we obtain that uN is glob-
ally Lipschitz and locally semi-concave. Moreover, the Lipschitz and local semi-concavity constants are
independent of N .
Arguing as in the previous subsection, the pair (uN , ρN) solves
−∂tuN +H(∇uN , x) = fN (x, ρN (t)) in Rd × (0, T ),
∂tρN − div (∂ξH(∇uN , x)ρN ) = 0 in Rd × (0, T ),
uN (·, T ) = gN (·, ρN (T )), ρN(0) = m0 in Rd.
 (MFGN )
Conversely, associated to any solution (uN , ρN ) we have the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in
distributed open-loop strategies (γN , . . . , γN ) ∈ AN for the N -player game. Moreover, using again the
results in [12, Chapter 6], any γN ∈ A defining such equilibrium satisfies
(4.28) γ˙xN (t) = −∂ξH (∇uN (γ
x
N (t), t), γ
x
N (t)) ∀ t ∈ (0, T ), γ
x
N (0) = x,
for a.e. x ∈ supp(m0). Thus, we can think of the r.h.s. above as an optimal control which is feedback
with respect to the individual states. We call (γN , . . . , γN ) a Nash equilibrium in distributed Markov
strategies for the N -player game. As a consequence of the previous discussion, such equilibria exist for
all N ∈ N provided that (A2) holds true.
Let us consider a sequence (γN )N∈N of elements in A defining Nash equilibria in distributed Markov
strategies for theN -player games. Theorem 3.1 yields the existence of a Lagrangian equilibriumm∗ ∈ Arel
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and a subsequence (γNk)k∈N such that γNk♯m0 → m∗ as k → ∞. Let γ∗ ∈ A be such that m∗ = γ∗♯m0
and γx∗ ∈ S(x) for all x ∈ R
d, i.e. an equilibrium in distributed Markov strategies for the MFG.
Our aim now is to study the convergence of the associated time marginals ρNk to ρ, the convergence
of the associated value functions uNk to u and, finally, the convergence of γ
x
Nk
to γx∗ for a.e. x ∈ R
d.
We will need the following preliminary result.
Lemma 4.2. Assume (A2)(ii) and let K ⊆ Rd be a nonempty compact set. Consider a sequence of
measures (µk)k∈N ⊆ P1(Rd) such that supp(µk) ⊆ K, for all k ∈ N, and, as k → ∞, µk → µ for some
µ ∈ P1(Rd). Then, for any sequence (xk)k∈N and x ∈ Rd such that xk → x, we have
(4.29) h(x, µ) = lim
k→∞
hk(xk, µk),
where h = f , g and hk is defined by (4.25).
Proof. Notice that (A2)(ii) implies that
(4.30) |hk(xk, µk)− hk(x, µk)| ≤ Cf,g|x− xk|.
Now, let Y k1 , . . . , Y
k
k be independent and identically distributed K-valued random variables, defined on
some probability space (Ωk,Fk,Pk), with common distribution µk. Using that P(P(K)) is compact and
arguing as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we obtain that, as k → ∞, the P1(Rd)-valued random sequence(
1
k−1
∑k
j=2 δY kj
)
k∈N
converges in distribution to the deterministic measure µ. Since (4.30) can be written
as ∣∣∣∣∣∣hk(xk, µk)−Ek
h
x, 1
k − 1
k∑
j=2
δY k
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cf,g|x− xk|,
relation (4.29) follows by letting k →∞. 
Theorem 4.1. Assume that (A2) holds. Then, the following assertions hold true:
(i) The sequence (ρNk)k∈N converges to ρ in C([0, T ];P1(R
d)).
(ii) The sequence (uNk)k∈N converges to u uniformly on compact subsets of R
d × [0, T ].
(iii) For a.e. x ∈ Rd, the sequence (γxNk)k∈N converges to γ
x
∗ uniformly in [0, T ] and (γ˙
x
Nk
)k∈N converges
to γ˙x∗ in the weak* topology in L
∞([0, T ];Rd).
Proof. Assertion (i) follows directly from Theorem 3.1. Note that (A2) implies that (uNk)k∈N is a
sequence of uniformly bounded functions on Rd × [0, T ]. Let us fix (x, t) ∈ Rd × [0, T ]. The definition of
uNk , Remark 4.3(ii) and Lemma 4.2 imply that
(4.31) lim sup
k→∞
uNk(x, t) ≤ u(x, t).
Let γx,tNk ∈ S
N (x, t) and γx,t ∈ C([t, T ];Rd) be a cluster point of (γx,tNk)k∈N, with respect to the uniform con-
vergence. The existence of γx,t is ensured by (4.26) and the Arzela`-Ascoli theorem. Up to the extraction
of a subsequence, we can assume that lim infk→∞ uNk(x, t) = limk→∞ uNk(x, t) and limk→∞ γ
x,t
Nk
= γx,t in
C([t, T ];Rd). Using estimate (4.26) again, we get that γ˙x,t exists and γ˙x,tNk → γ˙
x,t in the weak* topology
in L∞([0, T ];Rd). By the weak lower semi-continuity of the cost functional we obtain
u(x, t) ≤
∫ T
t
[
L(−γ˙x,t(s), γx,t(s)) + f(γx,t(s), ρ(s))
]
ds+ g(γx,t(T ), ρ(T )) ≤ lim inf
k→∞
uNk(x, t).
Thus, by (4.31) we get the pointwise convergence
lim
k→+∞
uNk(x, t) = u(x, t) ∀ (x, t) ∈ R
d × [0, T ],
and hence, using that uNk is Lipschitz continuous, with a Lipschitz constant which is independent of
k, assertion (ii) follows from the Arzela`-Ascoli theorem. Finally, (iii) is a consequence of the previous
analysis with t = 0 and the fact that [12, Corollary 6.4.10] implies that for a.e. x ∈ Rd the optimization
problem associated with u(x, 0) admits a unique solution. 
Recall that, as in the case of (MFG), to each solution (uN , ρN ) of (MFGN ) we can associate a
symmetric equilibrium (mN , . . . ,mN) ∈ ANrel of the N -player game. As a consequence of this fact,
Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1, we have the following result.
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Corollary 4.1. Let ((uN , ρN ))N∈N be a sequence of solutions to (MFGN ) (N ∈ N). Then, there exists
a solution (u, ρ) ∈ C([0, T ];P1(Rd)) to (MFG) such that, up to some subsequence, uN → u uniformly
over compact subsets of Rd × [0, T ] and ρN → ρ in C([0, T ];P1(Rd)).
Remark 4.5. If h = f , g satisfies∫
Rd
(h(x, µ) − h(x, µ′)) d(µ− µ′)(x) ≥ 0 ∀ µ, µ′ ∈ P1(R
d),
then the solution (u, ρ) to (MFG) is unique (see [34] and [30, Corollary 5.2]). Since any Lagrangian
equilibrium m∗ can be represented by γ∗♯m0, where γ
x
∗ ∈ S(x) is uniquely determined for a.e. x ∈ R
d, the
Lagrangian equilibrium must also be unique. In this case, the results in Theorem 4.1 hold for the entire
sequence (uN , ρN , γN ) and the result in Corollary 4.1 holds for the entire sequence (uN , ρN ).
Finally, let us point out that the convergence result in Corollary 4.1 can also be established directly,
without appealing to Theorem 3.1, under a stronger regularity assumption than (A2)(ii). Indeed, assume
that, in addition to (A2), m0 ∈ Lp(Rd) for some p ∈ (1,+∞]. If (uN , ρN ) solves (MFGN ), then by
[3, Theorem 8.2.1] and the results in [12, Chapter 6], we must have that ρN (t) = γ
(·)
N (t)♯m0, for some
γN ∈ A such that γxN ∈ S
N (x) for all x ∈ supp(m0). Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 4.1 we get the
existence of C′ > 0 such that
sup
x∈supp(m0), t∈[0,T ]
|γ˙xN (t)| ≤ C
′ ∀ N ∈ N.
Therefore, there exists C > 0 and a compact set K ⊆ Rd, both independent of N , such that γxN (t) ∈ K
for a.e. x ∈ supp(m0) and all t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, supp(ρN (t)) ⊆ K and d1(ρN (s), ρN (t)) ≤ C|s− t|
for all s, t ∈ [0, T ] and N ∈ N. This implies the existence of ρ ∈ C([0, T ];P1(Rd)) such that, up to
some subsequence, ρN → ρ in C([0, T ];P1(R
d)) as N → ∞. Since Lemma 4.2 implies that fN (·, ρN (·))
converges uniformly to f(·, ρ(·)) on compact subsets of Rd× [0, T ], standard stability results for viscosity
solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations imply that, up to some subsequence, uN → u uniformly
on compact subsets of Rd× [0, T ], u being the unique viscosity solution to (4.10). In particular, uN being
locally semi-concave with respect to the space variable, uniformly in N , for all t ∈ [0, T ] we have that
∇uN (x, t)→ ∇u(x, t) for a.e. x ∈ Rd. Using that uN is globally Lipschitz, uniformly in N , by dominated
convergence we deduce that
(4.32) ∂ξH (∇uN(·, ·), ·)→ ∂ξH (∇u(·, ·), ·) in L1([0, T ];Ls(Rd)) for any s ∈ [1,+∞).
On the other hand, using again the uniform local semiconcavity of uN(·, t) and arguing as in the proof
Proposition 4.1 we get the existence of c3 > 0, independent of N , such that
(4.33) ‖ρN(t)‖Lp ≤ c3‖m0‖Lp ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
Using this bound, we obtain that ρ(t) is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure for a.e.
t ∈ [0, T ], and its density, denoted likewise by ρ(t), satisfies ‖ρ(t)‖Lp ≤ c3‖m0‖Lp for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]. Since
ρ ∈ C([0, T ];P1(Rd)), the previous bound implies that for all t ∈ [0, T ], the measure ρ(t) is absolutely
continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure and the estimate ‖ρ(t)‖Lp ≤ c3‖m0‖Lp holds. Moreover, using
(4.32)-(4.33) we can pass to the limit in the second equation (MFGN ) to obtain that the pair (u, ρ)
solves (MFG).
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